

**North Lincoln Fire and Rescue**

**Echo Mountain Fire Complex  
and Straight Line Wind Event  
OERS #2020-2258**

**After Action Review**

**Submitted by: Organizational Quality Associates 1-3-2021**

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## Echo Mountain Fire Complex Overview

On Monday, September 7, 2020 at approximately 2300 hours multiple fire starts were reported near Otis, Oregon. The starts coincided with a Red Flag fire behavior warning issued by the National Weather Service for a forecasted East wind event that lasted several days. The result was large fires were burning in all western Oregon, from the northern to the southern border. The fires were burning in the urban interface area--leading to large scale evacuations and extreme demand for firefighting resources. This demand was compounded by sustained, long-term large fire activity in California and other western states. Consequently, local, regional, and national firefighting resources were in short supply, leaving few to respond to new incidents.

Numerous official warmings, advisories, and alerts were issued by agencies before and during the Echo Mountain and Kimberling fires:

- Countywide Burn Ban began at 1300 hours on 09/03/20
- Fire Weather Watch by the National Weather Service began at 1000 hours on 09/08/20
- Red Flag Warning by the National Weather Service began at 1200 hours on 09/07/20
- Smoke Advisory by the National Weather Service at 1809 hours on 09/11/20
- Lincoln Alerts public messaging sent out:
  - Burn Ban at 1300 hours on 09/03/20
  - Red Flag/Fire Weather Watch at 1809 hours on 09/06/20
  - Smoke Advisory at 1951 hours on 09/07/20

With this backdrop, local Fire Districts, and mutual aid partners (comprised of neighboring County Fire Districts as well as surrounding municipalities and other counties), along with what was available from local, state, and federal resources, responded to the Echo Mountain and Kimberling fires near Otis. On September 8, the two fires made extensive runs, threatening several thousand structures, and forcing significant evacuations. The scarcity of resources required that firefighting resources concentrate on evacuations with limited tactical operations for the next 3 days. The Oregon Department of Forestry (ODF) put together a short Type 3 Incident Management Team (IMT) that successfully limited the spread of the Kimberling Fire. After 4 days, on September 11 at 0600, a short Type 1 IMT (components from ODF IMT1) with an Incident Commander (IC) from the Florida Forest Service assumed command of what became the Echo Mountain Fire Complex.

The local Fire Districts, assisting agencies, and cooperators stopped the forward spread of the fires prior to the transfer of command to ODF IMT 1. The complex terrain, steep slopes, loose coastal soils, and extensive wildland urban interface added to the complexity of this incident. Additional complexities included extensive evacuations, infrastructure damage, highway closures, and lack of resources across the nation.

Local County and Lincoln City agencies' leadership recognized that the response to the incident was one that would likely occur again and had the foresight to recognize that they could improve. With that in mind, a Request for a Proposal to develop an After Action Review was issued through the North Lincoln Fire and Rescue District 1.

## After Action Review

An After Action Review (AAR) of the local and State of Oregon response to Echo Mountain Fire Complex within Lincoln County, Oregon, was conducted virtually on November 30, 2020. The AAR was attended by participants from various agencies within Lincoln City, , Lincoln County, and the State of Oregon. A list of attendees and their agencies is included as an appendix to this document.

The AAR was facilitated by an external consultant, Organizational Quality Associates, Inc (OQA). Report content was captured through participant discussions during the review, and individual interviews before the review. Based on participant comments and descriptions of the Echo Mountain Fire Complex response, OQA recommends five key improvement areas for consideration by the lead agencies.

A sizeable number of additional suggestions meant to increase response efficiencies were made by the AAR participants. These are contained within the participant responses of this report and should be studied for possible inclusion in the AAR's Improvement Plan.

The AAR reviewed the following **Echo Mountain Fire Complex** response capabilities:

- *Initial Fire Response (first 36 hours)*
- *County Fire Mutual Aid*
- *Incident Management (Type 3 to Type 1 transition)*
- *Public Evacuation Process, Sheltering Operations, and Law Enforcement Mutual Aid*
- *Public Information*
- *EOC Operations and Coordination*

Participants were asked to respond to the following questions for each of the response capability categories:

1. *What notable objectives were met during the Echo Mountain Fire Complex?*
2. *What were the most difficult challenges and how were they overcome?*
3. *What issues/tasks were not resolved, and what will it take to resolve them?*

In this report, the responses given by the participants are organized into six common themes:

1. *Communications*
2. *Incident Management, Call Center and EOC Coordination*
3. *Staffing*
4. *Preparedness*
5. *Evacuations and Sheltering*
6. *Relationships*

## **AAR Participant Responses**

### **Notable Objectives Met During the Echo Mountain Fire Complex Response**

#### **Objectives Met - Communications**

- Overcoming the lack of communication regarding the incidents when the cell phone tower went down by still making sound dispatch decisions.
- Lincoln City Dispatch was able to get additional dispatchers on console to assist with influx of calls. Communication from the incidents to dispatch worked well until power was disrupted at the communication tower and the batteries for both cell phone and radio system ran out of power.
- Initial communication between the IC and dispatch via radio provided timely updates and excellent situational awareness.
- Initial communication between the IC and County Emergency Management via cell phone provided timely updates, excellent situational awareness, and coordination.
- Timely notifications regarding incident status and evacuations were made by Lincoln City dispatch, County Emergency Management, and the Sheriff's office.
- Cell phone communication was the most successful form of communication until the Highland cell phone tower was compromised.
- Timely information regarding status of incidents to dispatch insured that distractions were minimized.
- Depoe Bay Fire District's resources had good situational awareness because of cell phone communications with the IC.
- When Toledo Dispatch lost communication, Lincoln City Dispatch was able to successfully take over their 911 call system.
- Lincoln City Dispatch was able to send CAD events between WVCC and LCPD after internet service was restored. This was important for communication between centers.
- Moving the Sheriff's Office command center trailer from Rose Lodge to Lincoln City augmented communication when the Highland Tower site lost power and batteries ran out and there was no generator on site.
- Timely communication provided good situational awareness on the status of the incidents.
- Communication between local Fire Chiefs and ODF was good.
- Timely information was provided to evacuees.
- The Lincoln County emergency notification system (Everbridge and Lincoln Alerts) worked well.
- Bilingual public messaging was accomplished after day 2.
- The PIOs were able to get and distribute timely information to the public.
- Establishing and updating traplines for public information was achieved.
- Positive media contacts were made.
- The Call Center was effective once initiated.

- The EOC and Fire resources received daily copies of the ICS-209s and Incident Action Plans. These were used at daily Division briefings and given to all crews.

### **Objectives Met - Incident Management, Call Center and EOC Coordination**

- The response was orderly and calm.
- Dispatchers were calm and professional throughout the chaotic time of initial response and extended attack.
- Containment efforts on the Kimberly Mtn. incident paid off with only the Echo Mtn. Fire making a sustained run.
- Ambulances running medical emergency calls independently lifted that burden from the Fire Districts so they could focus on the incidents.
- A requested Declaration of Conflagration from the Oregon State Fire Marshal's Office (OSFM) was initially turned down due to lack of Statewide resources. This fire was put in the queue if resources became available. None did. After the event OSFM made a policy decision to provide reimbursement to structural resources. This relieved a substantial financial burden to all Structural Mutual Aid agencies.
- Management of the Complex by the Lincoln County Type 4 IMT and the ODF Type 3 IMT prior to Transfer of Command to the ODF Type 1 IMT on September 11<sup>th</sup> set the Type 1 IMT up for success.
- All County Structural Fire Mutual Aid partners did a great job, stopping the fire before it reached Lincoln City.
- Communication and coordination between the Type 1 IMT and the local jurisdictions, including distribution of IAP's, coordination with local PIOs, EOCs, Sheriff's Office, Fire Chiefs, and government officials was efficient --a reflection of the leadership provided by the Type 1 IC from Florida.
- Recognizing the need and establishing a debris management team early on was effective in setting up the recovery process.
- Recognizing the need and establishing a donation management team and center early on was effective.
- The EOC coordinator briefings were well-attended across jurisdictions and response partners.
- Using triage criteria for structure protection was limited but successful.

### **Objectives Met -Staffing**

- Getting timely additional staffing to support dispatch operations was a success.
- Getting the order for a Type 1 IMT filled was a success. The Type 1 Team was ordered on September 9 and was in place less than 24 hours later.
- Volunteers were essential to the success of the PIO's.
- A modified staffing plan was adjusted several times and coordinated resources for structural fire protection. This plan utilized Mutual Aid partners and a combination of volunteer and career staff.

### **Objectives Met -Preparedness**

- Fire weather predictions allowed County Fire Districts to prepare for the incident (recall of resources, additional staffing).
- A coordinated statewide call to all Fire Defense Boards and Fire Chiefs by the State Fire Marshal relayed vital information for preparedness.

### **Objectives Met - Evacuation and Sheltering**

- Initial attack with limited resources on 2 separate incidents with significant urban interface primarily focused on evacuations without any fatalities.
- The Otis Fire Hall was used as the initial evacuation point worked well but was quickly overwhelmed.
- Timely decisions on evacuations of both people and animals led to success without any fatalities.
- Utilizing the Otis Fire Hall as staging for the Sheriff's Office Animal Control resources and coordination worked well.
- A clearly defined and signed evacuation route by the Sheriff's Office helped with the successful evacuation.
- Anticipating the need for a re-population plan for evacuated areas was helpful.
- Accomplishing a mass evacuation without experience and with no fatalities is notable.

### **Objectives Met -Relationships**

- The seamless response of different agencies on the incidents is notable.
- The seamless response of mutual aid resources is notable.
- Coordination and support from the Fire Defense Board and the State Fire Marshal's Office was excellent
- Coordination with the Sheriff's Office and the delivery of care to an injured firefighter occurred efficiently.
- Working relationships with the Sheriff's Office Search and Rescue ensured that personnel coordinated closely with all assigned resources and were not lost in the chaos.
- Developed relationships led to all eight structural fire agencies responding, as well as resources from neighboring counties, despite not having a formal mutual aid agreement. Nineteen different agencies sent resources, which reflects the spirit of the fire service.
- The response from local Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management was appreciated.
- The response of mutual aid resources was critical to a successful outcome during the first 36 hours of the incident due to resource scarcity.

- Despite having to move the sheltering operation several times, the coordinated effort between the county EOC and the American Red Cross was effective due to previously established relationships.

#### **Objectives Met -Relationships**

- Established relationships led to a smooth and successful public information effort.
- The work and coordination between law enforcement agencies throughout the incident was excellent.

### **Difficult Challenges Overcome During the Incident**

#### **Difficult Challenges Overcome - Communications**

- Communication was a challenge given the different cell phone vendors and unreliability of service. Examples such as the loss of the Highland Cell Tower site, Van Duzer Corridor being a notorious dead spot for radio coverage, and interoperability issues with radios were solved through an interim solution of switching to common direct radio frequencies that solved part of the problem.
- Loss of internet service between Valley and Coast took down Lincoln City Dispatch CAD system.
- Initially dispatchers thought there was one fire. There were two separate fires separated by three miles. Because of that there was a 40-minute delay in dispatching fire resources to the second fire. There was an overwhelming number of calls reporting fires in different locations. After that was corrected resources were immediately sent and evacuations were initiated. Both incidents were successfully coordinated by dispatch.
- Common direction for personnel establishing roadblocks was at first not available but was resolved with specific direction.
- Getting information to the EOC was difficult but was overcome by using current available technology.
- The loss of County email services also meant the loss of key contact lists. A workaround utilizing cell phone text messaging filled the gap.
- Cell phone service for the affected public was spotty at best. The utilization of media and other forms of communication solved the problem.
- The County EOC, located in the County Courthouse, experienced technology outages at different times including Gmail, internet access, webpage access, and network directory directories. Alternate systems (Everbridge) were used for contacts to cooperators when County Gmail was down.

#### **Difficult Challenges Overcome - Incident Management, Call Center and EOC Coordination**

- Dispatch was able to prioritize fire and EMS response without updated intelligence once communication systems were compromised.
- Down power/data transmission lines impeded access due to private property concerns until a recognition of life/safety issues allowed the emergency removal of the lines.



- Some Sheriff's Office personnel were unsure of their evacuation responsibilities initially, but they quickly realized evacuation was their responsibility and responded accordingly.
- Access issues for the responders were resolved by finding alternate routes.
- Access from the Toledo ODF Office was compromised due to transportation routes to Lincoln City being blocked by downed trees. Assistance was needed from the Dallas ODF Office to provide initial attack until highways could be cut open and Toledo could respond.
- Rumor management from social media sites was achieved.

#### **Difficult Challenges Overcome - Staffing**

- Scarcity of resources due to high fire activity in Oregon and California was solved by limiting the tactical fire response to primarily accomplishing evacuations.
- Not enough experienced deputies in evacuations. Overcame by using volunteers.
- Not enough resources required staggering work schedules.
- Agencies or Agency Representatives for Emergency Support Functions for the County EOC was limited due to agency response needs.

#### **Difficult Challenges Overcome - Preparedness**

No issues were identified

#### **Difficult Challenges Overcome - Evacuation and Sheltering**

- Fire progression causing relocation of the shelter operations four times at the immediate onset of the shelter and COVID19 conditions created immediate sheltering limitations for evacuees. Motel and hotel rooms were initiated to relocate evacuees from congregate sheltering to non-congregate sheltering. The City of Newport, for their use of the Newport Rec Center made the difference in these initial operations.

#### **Difficult Challenges Overcome - Relationships**

No issues were identified

## **What Issues Were Not Resolved and What Will it Take to Resolve Them:**

(note: the agencies are in parentheses who made the statements)

### **Unresolved Issues - Communications**

1. ODF's radio repeaters did not work well – this is a long-term issue.
2. We need a radio cache for extended attack operations. Uniform frequency handheld radios were not available for responders. (Fire)
3. Highland Cell Tower Site needs to be hardened against future incidents including a backup system and emergency power. Highland Tower Site does not have an emergency generator on-site, so when batteries failed there was not power until County Facilities and AT&T supplied a generator and 24/7 fuel resupply. (Fire, LCSO, EOC)
4. Batteries for Sheriff's Office communication trailer are insufficient backup for communication during long term power outage. A backup power source is needed. (LCSO)
5. Lack of a mobile communication center and common radio frequencies hindered operations. (Fire and LCSO)
6. Radio communication interoperability by all agencies involved was lacking. (Fire)
7. Lincoln City PD can communicate on Law 1 and Law 2 on their back up radio system. They were never asked to assist when WVCC got overwhelmed. Lincoln City and North Lincoln Fire have and added antennas and a new tower. Reprogramming the current back up radios to establish standalone resources on their Avtec consoles is a very cost effective solution. Establishing Lincoln City 911 as an additional back up site for county operations if Newport ever gets impacted like this and WVCC cannot stand up the backup center in Newport. (Dispatch)
8. Unit designators and last name conventions were used on the radio by resources on the same incident. Need to develop a common standard. (Fire)
9. Coordination was lacking with ODOT about the priorities of clearing transportation access. (Fire, LCSO)

### **Unresolved Issues - Incident Management, EOC and Call Center Coordination**

10. Unified Command was not formally established; therefore communications, objective development, logistics, and planning were done by separate response agencies. There was no established Unified Command representing all responsible jurisdictions. (Fire)
11. There was a lack of common tactical, incident situational awareness, and communications with adjoining forces. (Fire)
12. The County Fire Districts could not fill the ICS positions needed for a Type 3 organization. The County structural fire agencies need to have additional personnel trained to fill ICS roles and be prepared to start a Type 3 level team, locally or regionally, and be used to coordinate with ODF and the Oregon State Fire Marshal. (Fire)
13. Lack of maps reduced situational awareness by the County EOCs, PIOs and responders during initial and extended response. Maps became available once the ODF Type 1 IMT was in place. (EOC, Fire, and LCSO)
14. Responders were unable to coordinate all resources during evacuation. (LCSO)

15. Traffic management during evacuations was difficult. More resources and coordination between ODOT, cities and Law Enforcement. (EM, Fire, LCSO)
16. Responders were unable to coordinate with all responsible agencies in the developing the tactical plan. (Fire)
17. We need to be together for an operational period briefing in the same place. Together we should make critical decisions such as prioritizing evacuations, structural protection, fire attack and tactics. (Fire/LCSO)
18. In the wildland fire environment, we have different levels of capability, training, and safety standards such as the "10 and 18" and PPE within the County fire service agencies. (Fire)
19. There was no formal transition/transfer of command plan. (Fire)
20. Additional trained staff and support need to be available to staff the County EOC for 24/7 operation when needed. (EOC)
21. The County structural agencies need to strengthen their commitment to each other in an event like this. There needed to be 2-3 strike teams of structural protection resources in the first 12 hours. It took 30 hours to get the needed help. In the first 12-24 there only a few resources sent. (Fire) Nontraditional response agency personnel have not been trained to fill needed EOC staff positioned. (LCSO)
22. Evacuation Door Notification signs were not initially available during the evacuation process but were later available. (EOC/LCSO)
23. Information regarding specific property status was not available during the first week to 9 days of the response which the public had requested. The Sheriff's Office instituted a process for the evacuee's to "check on their properties" on 09/13. (EOC)
24. Call Center was not staffed 24/7 but there was a current conditions recorded message 24/7 and the option to leave a message for a return call the next day. (EOC)
25. It was challenging to transfer information from Fire Command to Law Command to County EOC for GIS evacuation maps - integrated mapping system by all agencies would have been more streamlined. (EOC)
26. Providing press briefings may have helped with sharing of current information with public and media. Few were provided except for prerecorded updates from Fire and law enforcement agencies. (EOC)
27. Bilingual capability for notifications, news releases, and current information templates were not available until the second day. (EOC)
28. Written County EOC sit reps were not initiated due to shortage of EOC support staff; however, detailed cooperator calls began on 09/10. (EOC)

#### **Unresolved Issues -Staffing**

29. More Assistant PIOs at the County EOC were needed to meet all the public communications needs. (EOC)
30. There was a shortage of public affairs or PIOs in key agencies. (EOC)
31. During the first 36 hours, there was no PIO at the incident to gather on-site information in a timely manner. (EOC)
32. Trained personnel were not available to establish a local (City/County) Type 3 IMT. (Fire)

### **Unresolved Issues -Staffing**

33. The current EOC physical space is challenging and does not accommodate space needed for full staffing activation or for utilizing EOC tools such as displaying of event maps/projection of current situation; however, County BOC has long term plan to build new EOC facility. (EOC)

### **Unresolved Issues - Preparedness**

34. The Lincoln City EOC was not activated. (EOC)
35. Not all jurisdictional partners recognized that disaster information is located on the County website. (EOC)
36. Mutual Aid resources wanted to be released after about 4 days. There is no Lincoln County-wide fire services established policy or mutual aid agreement for either initial/extended attack or longer timeframe such as fourteen days. Reimbursement standards should be part of the mutual aid agreement. (Fire)
37. There was no plan identifying long-term ICS facilities such as Incident Command Post, Incident Base, or Incident Camp. (Fire)
38. The local radio station did not have a generator for backup power. (EOC)

### **Unresolved Issues - Relationships, Evacuations and Sheltering**

No issues were identified.

## OQA's Key Recommendations

OQA offers five key recommendations which could substantially resolve many of the 40 “Challenges Not Overcome” shown in this After Action Report. Many of the challenges also have specific recommendations for resolution that came from the participants. We are not re-stating these participant recommendations, however, we believe they should also be considered for adoption in the AAR Improvement Plan.

The following are broader OQA recommendations that, if addressed and implemented, we believe will lead to a more robust, cohesive response to future incidents like the Echo Mountain Complex. Note: The numbers at the end of each recommendation reference “What Issues Were Not Resolved and What Will it Take to Resolve Them.”

**1. Unified Command:** Develop criteria and standards for when Unified Command should be used within Lincoln County. The standards and criteria should apply to all agencies having legal responsibility for an incident within Lincoln County. This includes not only Fire Districts, city, and county response agencies but also any state or federal agency with emergency response responsibilities within the County. Advantages of having Unified Command vary depending on what kind of an incident is involved, the complexity and duration of the incident, and the responsible agencies from within and outside the county. Unified Command not only ensures one operational Incident Action Plan (IAP) with one set of objectives but also can strengthen the capabilities of the County's IMT in Logistics, Planning, and Command Staff. A Unified Command with a blended (not duplicative) Command and General Staff, Unit Leaders, and Division/Group Supervisors can also relieve part of the workload for EOCs and dispatch organizations. (Challenges 10, 11, 14 – 16)

**2. Lincoln County Type 3 All Hazards IMT:** Develop through training and exercises an All Hazards Type 3 IMT made up of personnel from Lincoln County agencies and organizations only or with one or two adjoining counties to the east of Lincoln County, such as Benton and Polk Counties. Consider increasing the pool of qualified and available personnel by recruiting both in County, and in adjacent counties with mutual interest in the ability to field a qualified All Hazards Type 3 IMT for extended attack or to take command to complete incident actions such as mop-up or incident rehabilitation. At a minimum, recruit, train and fill positions for Incident Commander, Logistics, Operations, PIO, Safety, Liaison, Plans, and Finance. Consider augmenting with Division and Group Supervisor, Unit Leaders, and other miscellaneous overhead personnel to ensure the IMT can meet anticipated needs without having to fill through the resource ordering process.

The Emergency Management Institute and National Fire Administration offer guidelines and materials which can help jurisdictions develop a Type 3 IMT program and organization. The advantages for having a local All Hazards Type 3 IMT helps ensure that needed position training is obtained and multiple agencies train and exercise together. Additionally, the limited available

transportation routes into Lincoln County after an earthquake/tsunami will likely limit the availability of out-of-county IMTs for assistance to Lincoln County. (Challenges 12, 13, 31, 32)

### **3. Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs):**

Update existing or newly develop Emergency Operations Center (EOC) standard operating procedures (SOP) to identify the necessary EOC organization by activation level. Recruit, train and exercise a base organization dedicated to serve in the EOC when activated above day-to-day operations. Extend recruitment efforts to other agencies/departments internal and external to the County, including State EOC, as needed.

Immediately explore all opportunities for expanding the square footage of the County EOC facility and equipping it with state-of-the-art communication and coordination tools. A fully functional EOC, both in space and equipment, is critical for the EOC to fulfill its mission of coordination and support to IMTs.

Conduct facilitated discussions with Lincoln City EOC personnel and other City-level EOCs that may activate during a complex incident to pre-determine the roles and responsibilities of each. Reach agreement on how all activated EOCs in the County will integrate and coordinate tasks and actions to best serve Lincoln County responders and residents during a catastrophic incident including, but not limited to:

- a. Notification and mobilization of public officials and trained volunteer workers.
- b. Activation and operational guidelines of a Joint Information Center, and Call Centers.
- c. Gathering and organizing threat assessment and incident status information.
- d. Ordering and mobilizing incident management and response resources.

Challenges: (19, 21, 23-30, 34)

**4. Fire Districts:** Develop training and uniform standards for all County Fire Districts and mutual aid resources expected to be mobilized for wildfire incidents. including, but not limited to:

- a. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) such as fire-resistant clothing (not structural turnout gear), hard hats, 8-inch lace up boots, fire shelters, and gloves).
- b. Tactical skills tied to the positions filled.
- c. Safety (10 Standard Orders, 18 Watch Out Situations, communication, etc.).
- d. An annual wildland fire refresher.
- e. Training commensurate with expected positions.
- f. A mechanism to qualify, certify and document qualifications of personnel.

Consider utilizing the County Fire Defense Board for achieving uniform standards.  
(Challenges: 17)

**5. Lincoln County Fire Districts Mutual Aid Agreement:** Develop a countywide Mutual Aid Agreement. The agreement should include reimbursement standards for equipment and personnel and when reimbursement applies.

(Challenge: 36)

**6. Fire Districts' Relationships:** The Fire Districts within the County should strengthen their commitment to each other for incidents such as the Echo Mountain Fire Complex. This could be accomplished through the leadership of Fire Defense Board and implementation of Recommendations number 2, 4, and 5. (Challenge: 20)

## Appendix

	<b>As of 12-01-20 @ 1200 hours</b>	
<b>Nov 22, 2020 Echo Mtn AAR</b>	<b>Participant List</b>	
<b>0800-0855 Dispatching</b>	<b>Agency</b>	<b>Title</b>
Curtis Landers	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Sheriff
Ian Wilson	Willamette Valley Communications Center	Dispatch Supervisor
Matt Thomas	Oregon Department of Forestry	Unit Forester
Adam Shanks	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Administrative Lt.
Rob Dahlman	North Lincoln Fire & Rescue	Fire Chief
Rob Murphy	Newport Fire Department, County FDB Chief	Fire Chief
Bryan Daniels	Depoe Bay Fire District	Fire Chief
Derek Etheridge	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Patrol Sgt.
Michael Curran	Oregon Department of Forestry	District Forester
Shannon Miller	Oregon State Fire Marshal's Office	Field Deputy FM
Paul Compton	Lincoln City Police Department	Dispatch Supervisor
Thomas Jackson	Depoe Bay Fire District	Division Chief
<b>0900-0955 Initial Fire Response</b>	<b>Agency</b>	<b>Title</b>
BrianTucker	Oregon State Police	Lieutenant
Curtis Landers	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Sheriff
Brian Cameron	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Patrol Lt.
M. Cotes		
Adam Shanks	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Administrative Lt.
Loren Nordyke	North Lincoln Fire & Rescue	Batt. Chief
Bryan Daniels	Depoe Bay Fire District	Fire Chief
Matt Thomas	Oregon Department of Forestry	Unit Forester
Lyle Mattson	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Lt.
Rob Dahlman	North Lincoln Fire & Rescue	Fire Chief
Derek Etheridge	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Patrol Sargent
Michael Curran	Oregon Department of Forestry	District Forester
Rob Murphy	Newport Fire Department, County FDB Chief	Fire Chief
Shannon Miller	Oregon State Fire Marshal's Office	Field Deputy FM
Thomas Jackson	Depoe Bay Fire District	Division Chief
<b>1000-1055 County Fire Mutual Aid</b>		
Bryan Daniels	Depoe Bay Fire District	Fire Chief
Matt Thomas	Oregon Department of Forestry	Unit Forester
Rob Dahlman	North Lincoln Fire & Rescue	Fire Chief
Rob Murphy	Newport Fire Department, County FDB Chief	Fire Chief
Shannon Miller	Oregon State Fire Marshal's Office	Field Deputy FM
Thomas Jackson	Depoe Bay Fire District	Division Chief



<b>Nov 22, 2020 Echo Mtn AAR</b>	<b>Participant List</b>	
<b>1100-1155 Incident Management</b>	<b>Agency</b>	<b>Title</b>
M. Cates		
Curtis Landers	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Sheriff
Adams Shanks	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Administrative Lt.
Rick Dolan	Florida Forest Service	ODF IMT-1 Incident Commander
Shannon Miller	Oregon State Fire Marshal's Office	Field Deputy FM
Bryan Daniels	Depoe Bay Fire District	Fire Chief
Matt Thomas	Oregon Department of Forestry	Unit Forester
Jenny Demaris	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Emergency Manager
Rob Dahlman	North Lincoln Fire & Rescue	Fire Chief
Lyle Mattson	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Lt.
Derek Etheridge	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Patrol Sargent
Michael Curran	Oregon Department of Forestry	District Forester
Ken Murphy	City of Lincoln City	Emergency Manager
Bob Harvey	Newport Fire Department	Assistant Fire Chief
Rob Murphy	Newport Fire Department, County FDB Chief	Fire Chief
Thomas Jackson	Depoe Bay Fire District	Division Chief
<b>1300-1355 Public Evacuation, Sheltering and Law Enforcement Mutual Aid</b>		
Patrick Dougherty	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Patrol Sgt & SAR
Bruce McGuire	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Deputy & SAR Coordinator
Adam Shanks	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Administrative Lt.
Brian Cameron	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Patrol Lt.
Lyle Mattson	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Lt.
Bryan Daniels	Depoe Bay Fire District	Fire Chief
Matt Thomas	Oregon Department of Forestry	Unit Forester
Jenny Demaris	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Emergency Manager
Rob Dahlman	North Lincoln Fire & Rescue	Fire Chief
Laura Ireland	Lincoln County Animal Services	Animal Shelter Director
Derek Etheridge	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Patrol Sargent
Michael Curran	Oregon Department of Forestry	District Forester
Michelle Hendrick	American Red Cross	
Ken Murphy	City of Lincoln City	Emergency Manager
Shannon Miller	Oregon State Fire Marshal's Office	Field Deputy FM
Thomas Jackson	Depoe Bay Fire District	Division Chief
Curtis Landers	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Sheriff
Rene Lopez	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Patrol Sgt.
M. Cates		
Susan Trachsel		Alternate PIO

<b>1400-1455 Public Information</b>	<b>Participant List</b>	
Jess Palma		PIO Support
Susan Trachsel		Alternate PIO
Curtis Landers	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Sheriff
Samantha Buckley	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Asst. Emergency Manager
Casey Miller		Lead PIO
Matt Thomas	Oregon Department of Forestry	Unit Forester
Jenny Demaris	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Emergency Manager
Rob Dahlman	North Lincoln Fire & Rescue	Fire Chief
Michael Curran	Oregon Department of Forestry	District Forester
Shannon Miller	Oregon State Fire Marshal's Office	Field Deputy FM
Ken Murphy	City of Lincoln City	Emergency Manager
<b>Nov 22, 2020 Echo Mtn Complex AAR</b>		
<b>1500-1555 – EOC Ops. and Coordination</b>	<b>Agency</b>	<b>Title</b>
Susan Trachsel		Alternate PIO
Adam Shanks	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Adm. Lt.
Samantha Buckley	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Asst. EM Manager
Matt Thomas	Oregon Department of Forestry	Unit Forester
Jenny Demaris	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Emergency Manager
Rob Dahlman	North Lincoln Fire & Rescue	Fire Chief
Curtis Landers	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Sheriff
Jess Palma		PIO Support
Michael Curran	Oregon Department of Forestry	District Forester
Ken Murphy	City of Lincoln City	Emergency Manager
Shannon Miller	Oregon State Fire Marshal's Office	Field Deputy FM
Thomas Jackson	Depoe Bay Fire District	Division Chief
<b>1600-1700 Host Agencies</b>		
Ken Murphy	City of Lincoln City	Emergency Manager
Rob Dahlman	North Lincoln Fire & Rescue	Fire Chief
Jenny Demaris	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Emergency Manager
Matt Thomas & Michael Curran	Oregon Department of Forestry	Unit Forester/District Forester