

# ***LWC TTX4 (Wildfire) Summary***

**23-July-2025, 1400 – 1600 PDT**

## **Alphabetized Keywords & Phrases**

- 911 call
- Action Report (AAR)
- Communication issues
- Community communication
- Community education
- Community preparedness
- Echo Mountain Fire
- Elevation changes
- Emergency kits
- Emergency planning
- Emergency response
- Emergency supplies
- Evacuation plans
- Evacuation routes
- Fire extinguishers
- Fire hazards
- Fire mitigation
- Fire prevention
- Fire safety
- Fire shelters
- ICS
- Incident Command System
- Mutual aid agreements
- Power outage
- Public education
- Radio channels
- Radio communication
- Safety captains
- Safety officers
- Shelter in place
- Smoke inhalation
- Structure fires
- Water contamination
- Weather monitoring
- Wildfire safety
- Wildland fire

## **Alphabetized Attendees List**

- Bill **Albright**
- Paul **Banas**
- Susan **Banas**
- John **Bingham**
- Les **Blumenthal**
- Anne **Bradley**
- Paul **Caldron**
- Joe **Cannon**
- John **Davisson**
- Dave **Dumas**
- Molly **Dumas**
- Chuck **Duncan**
- Don **Foot**
- Pat **Hossle**
- Chris **Lodge**
- Cheryl **Meece**
- Shirley **Pease**
- John **Penrod**
- Ken **Williams**
- Michael **Tomlinson & Assorted Als** (recorders)

## **Overview**

The meeting focused on fire preparedness and lessons learned from the Echo Mountain Fire. Key points included the importance of early evacuation, the need for better communication, and the challenges of mutual aid agreements. Dave Dumas highlighted the historical fire risks, the potential for structure fires, and the importance of fire mitigation efforts. The group discussed the effectiveness of the Incident Command System (ICS) and the need for improved coordination with local authorities. They also emphasized the importance of individual preparedness, such as having N95 masks and evacuation plans, and the potential risks of staying in place during a fire. The meeting focused on emergency preparedness, emphasizing the importance of early action and calling 911 in fire situations. Dave Dumas highlighted the need for high humidity to mitigate fire risks, and discussed the effectiveness of backpack fire extinguishers and the dangers of vehicle fires. Paul Banas mentioned the outlawing of cedar shake roofs and the challenges of wood-burning fireplaces. The group also discussed the potential for using radios and setting up separate communication channels for emergencies. They proposed mandating

radios for new residents and improving community education on emergency response plans. The meeting discussed strategies for surviving wildfires, emphasizing the importance of sheltering in place and evacuation plans. Paul Caldron suggested using low tide to escape to the platform at the base of the basalt cliff, while Dave Dumas highlighted the effectiveness of fire shelters. Cheryl Meece noted that east winds could create a bowl effect in the Cove, potentially reducing smoke exposure. The group also discussed improving fire resistance of buildings, ensuring residents have radios, and the importance of clear communication and community education. They agreed on the need for flexible plans and better coordination among safety captains and residents.

### **Action Items**

- [ ] Reach out to the Lincoln County Emergency Management office to discuss improving communication and coordination.
- [ ] Coordinate with the Depoe Bay Fire Department to ensure they are aware of the community's incident command structure and preparedness efforts.
- [ ] Organize a community-wide fire awareness and preparedness event during the peak of fire season.
- [ ] Encourage residents to review and update their personal emergency preparedness plans, including ensuring they have adequate fuel in their vehicles and emergency supplies.
- [ ] Investigate the feasibility of purchasing additional backpack fire pumps to be strategically placed around the community.
- [ ] Explore options for addressing fire hazards posed by remaining wood-burning fireplaces in the community.
- [ ] Bill and Mike to determine the best additional radio channel to use for internal communications, and ensure all Safety Captains and ICS members have the channel programmed.
- [ ] Implement a policy to provide new residents with two radios as part of their move-in fees, to improve community-wide communication. Two radios are suggested because residents will be free to experiment with using the radios amongst themselves and each

household will have a backup radio in the event that one radio is not working (e.g., because the battery is drained).

- [ ] Explore ways to further fireproof the community center building, such as adding exterior sprinklers, to potentially serve as a safer shelter option.
- [ ] Organize community events and outreach to educate residents on emergency preparedness, including the shelter-in-place plan and backup evacuation options.

## **Outline**

### **Introductions and Meeting Purpose**

- Anne Bradley (Safety Committee Chair) thanks everyone for attending and outlines the meeting's purpose: to discuss the modified FEMA structure and the Incident Command System (ICS) to ensure readiness for emergencies, in this case – wildland fires.
- Safety Committee Chair highlights the goal of having positions identified and tasks identified for emergency situations, emphasizing the importance of a plug-and-play operation.
- Dave Dumas is introduced as the main speaker for the day, with extensive experience in firefighting and forest management.

### **Historical Fire Context and Echo Mountain Fire**

- Dave Dumas provides a historical overview of fires in the area, starting with a significant fire in 1936 that burned through Depoe Bay and jumped Highway 101 (refer to appendix).
- He discusses the Echo Mountain Fire that occurred on Labor Day weekend, 2020, which served as a major wake-up call for the community. The government-funded After Action Report is included in the appendix).
- Dave Dumas explains the importance of understanding fire history and the potential for fires in the area, emphasizing that fires can and will happen here.

- The conversation shifts to the specific scenarios of potential fires in the area, including falling embers, human-caused fires, and structure fires.

### **Lessons Learned from Echo Mountain Fire**

- Dave Dumas recounts the events of the Echo Mountain Fire, highlighting the lack of communication and resources during the initial stages.
- Michael Tomlinson shares his personal experience of receiving no warning about the fire until a sheriff's deputy arrived at his RV park located in Lincoln City.
- Paul Banas discusses the challenges of activating the ICS structure and the lack of information during the fire.
- Molly Dumas suggests that better communication and early alerts could have improved the situation, and Anne Bradley mentions the current protocol of a 24-hour alert.

### **Improving Communication and Coordination**

- Paul Banas and Anne Bradley discuss the need for better communication with Lincoln County EOC and other local authorities.
- Dave Dumas suggests reaching out to Depoe Bay fire department to ensure they are aware of the community's efforts and needs.
- Cheryl Meece and Molly Dumas talk about the ad-hoc efforts made during the Echo Mountain Fire, including using radios and posting notes for residents.
- The group agrees on the importance of having a more organized and proactive approach to communication and coordination.

### **Preparation and Prevention Strategies**

- John Penrod raises concerns about the human factor in fire prevention, emphasizing the need for residents to be aware of fire safety in their homes.

- Dave Dumas discusses the importance of fire mitigation efforts, including tree trimming and thinning, and the role of insurance companies in driving these efforts.
- The conversation touches on the need for ongoing education and awareness among residents about fire prevention and preparedness.
- John Bingham suggests the idea of having professional-quality fire hoses and couplings available for residents to use in case of a fire.
- Dave Dumas pointed out that hoses and nozzles alone would not work because the pump on the fire engine is required to obtain the necessary pressure.

## **Evacuation and Survival Plans**

- The group discusses the challenges of evacuation during a fire, including the potential for traffic jams and the risks of staying in place.
- Dave Dumas explains the importance of having a plan and being prepared to evacuate early if necessary.
- Michael Tomlinson shares his personal experience of evacuating from Lincoln City (at Level 1) during the Echo Mountain Fire and the importance of having a full (or at least half) gas tank.
- The conversation highlights the need for residents to have individual evacuation plans and to be aware of the potential risks and challenges.

## **Early Response and 911 Calls**

- Dave Dumas emphasizes the importance of calling 911 immediately in case of an emergency, highlighting the negative outcomes of delayed calls.
- Dave Dumas recounts the perfect storm conditions (strong easterly winds, high temperatures, and low humidity) at Echo Mountain and Chuck Duncan's neighborhood during the Holiday Farm Fire along the McKenzie River in Lane County during the widespread Oregon wildland fires of September 2020.

- The discussion includes the benefits of high humidity in preventing fires and the importance of monitoring weather conditions daily.
- John Davisson suggests that early action and careful weather monitoring can prevent severe fire spread.

### **Firefighting Equipment and Preparedness**

- John Davisson and Dave Dumas discuss the effectiveness of backpack fire extinguishers and the need for more of them in the community.
- Michael Tomlinson mentions different types of Indian brand fire extinguishers, including collapsible and rigid plastic tanks, and their costs.
- The conversation touches on the importance of having firefighting equipment readily available for both house fires and wildland fires.
- Paul Banas and Dave Dumas discuss the potential dangers of using fire extinguishers without proper training and the importance of calling 911 first.

### **Community Preparedness and Hazardous Materials**

- John Penrod raises concerns about the balance between preparing for emergencies and the use and storage of hazardous materials such as fuel for generators, etc.
- Paul Banas mentions the outlawing of cedar shake roofs and the impact on fire safety.
- The discussion includes the need for aggressive forestry maintenance and the potential trade-offs in community safety.
- Cheryl Meece suggests outlawing wood-burning fireplaces due to their fire hazard, and Paul Banas discusses the challenges of enforcing such regulations.

### **Wildfire Scenarios and Evacuation Plans**

- Paul Caldron discusses the impact of wind direction on fire behavior and the potential for smoke and heat to affect the community.

- Dave Dumas explains the importance of clearing areas before deploying fire shelters and the challenges of surviving in high-heat conditions.
- The conversation includes the potential for using elevation changes and water bodies to create safety margins during wildfires.
- John Davisson and Cheryl Meece discuss the importance of having a clear evacuation plan and the potential for using the coast as a refuge.

### **Communication and Coordination**

- Molly Dumas emphasizes the need for effective communication and coordination among different units during emergencies.
- Cheryl Meece mentions the importance of having incident command forms and contact lists ready for quick reference.
- The discussion includes the need for flexible plans and the ability to adapt to changing conditions.
- Bill Albright suggests setting up a separate radio channel for emergency communication to avoid overloading the main channel.

### **Community Education and Radio Usage**

- John Davisson highlights the importance of educating the community about emergency preparedness and the use of radios.
- Molly Dumas suggests organizing events to ensure new residents are informed and equipped with radios.
- Paul Banas proposes mandating the purchase of radios for new residents as part of their community fees.
- The conversation includes the need for clear signage and information kiosks to keep residents informed.



## **Sheltering in Place and Fireproofing Buildings**

- Dave Dumas discusses the benefits of sheltering in place during emergencies and the importance of having a sprinkler system in key buildings.
- The conversation includes the potential for making buildings more fire-resistant by clearing debris and maintaining vegetation.
- Dave Dumas mentions the importance of having a clear perimeter around buildings to reduce fire risk.
- The discussion includes the potential for using sprinkler systems on the exterior of buildings to provide additional safety during fires.

## **Emergency Response and After-Action Reports**

- Dave Dumas emphasizes the importance of after-action reports to improve emergency response plans.
- The conversation includes the need for detailed records of actions taken during emergencies to identify areas for improvement.
- Cheryl Meece mentions the importance of having incident command forms and contact lists ready for quick reference.
- The discussion includes the need for flexible plans and the ability to adapt to changing conditions.

## **Community Involvement and Preparedness**

- Molly Dumas suggests organizing events to ensure new residents are informed and equipped with radios.
- The conversation includes the need for clear signage and information kiosks to keep residents informed.
- Paul Banas proposes mandating the purchase of radios for new residents as part of their community fees.
- The discussion includes the importance of community gatherings and face-to-face communication to disseminate information.

## **Discussion on Fire Safety and Evacuation Strategies**

- Paul Caldron discusses the impact of fires coming from the west and the wind direction, suggesting a scenario where people can scale down a basalt cliff at low tide to escape the smoke and heat.
- Dave Dumas shares his experience with fire shelters, emphasizing the importance of clearing out flammable material and getting face-down in the dirt to survive.
- Paul Banas questions the smoke plume's behavior, suggesting that elevation changes might provide a safety margin.
- Cheryl Meece and Dave Dumas discuss the wind's impact on the Cove, noting that it could either blow smoke over the top or roll right over the area, depending on the wind direction.

## **Survivability and Evacuation Options**

- John Davisson suggests buying a Zodiac and coordinating with the Coast Guard for evacuation, given the number of people involved.
- Cheryl Meece and John Davisson discuss the survivability of people who got into the water during the Lahaina (Hawaii) fire, noting that those who swam out survived.
- Paul Caldron and Dave Dumas agree that the best strategy is to get to a lower and further location, emphasizing the importance of being prepared for the worst-case scenario.
- John Davisson highlights the need for education and planning, suggesting that people should know their options and how to survive for a week if necessary.

## **Acceptable Risk and Personal Experiences**

- Anne Bradley discusses the acceptable risk of living in the area, mentioning her personal experience during the Echo Mountain Fire and the decision to leave for Corvallis unaware that they were driving toward other wildland fires.

- Don Foot emphasizes the importance of having supplies like food and water, especially if power is out, and the need for boiling water to avoid contamination.
- Dave Dumas talks about the incident command system and the importance of sheltering in place, noting that multiple hazards during the Echo Mountain Fire made it difficult to convey safety information to residents.
- Dave Dumas suggests appointing a safety officer to conduct reconnaissance and report back to the incident command, encouraging residents to shelter in place to avoid becoming part of the problem.

### **Fire-Resistant Buildings and Communication**

- John Penrod questions the feasibility of making buildings more fire-resistant, suggesting that the community could control the perimeter around the building to make it less fire-prone.
- Dave Dumas explains that while sprinkler systems are effective for interior fires, they might not be as effective for exterior fires, especially if the fire starts on the outside.
- John Penrod proposes the idea of using lawn sprinklers or garden hoses to fight wildland fires, but Dave Dumas notes that tapping into the water system could decrease pressure for fire department use.
- The group discusses the importance of having multiple evacuation routes, including the North Gate and the back gate, and the need for work crews to clear roads in case of tree blockages.

### **Communication and Coordination**

- Molly Dumas emphasizes the importance of communication and having forms to jot down information during emergencies, noting that inaccurate information can cause confusion.
- Cheryl Meece describes the binders she has prepared for each unit, including contact lists, command lists, and incident briefing forms from FEMA.

- The group discusses the need for flexibility and the ability to improvise during emergencies, with Dave Dumas highlighting the importance of the incident command system and communication.
- Bill Albright suggests setting up a separate radio channel for the group to communicate without broadcasting to the entire community, and Paul Banas agrees and asks Bill Albright and the rest of the Communications Group to explore this option.

## **Education and Community Preparedness**

- John Davisson raises concerns about the number of residents who have radios, noting that new families might not be aware of the importance of communication.
- Molly Dumas suggests educating new residents through community events and personal meetings, emphasizing the need for emergency kits and radios.
- Paul Banas proposes mandating that new residents pay an extra fee to receive two radios, similar to the current fee for gate clickers.
- The group agrees that including radios in the new resident package is a good idea, and Anne Bradley suggests starting with a lower fee to make it more acceptable.

## **Final Thoughts and Next Steps**

- Dave Dumas emphasizes the importance of having multiple ways to disseminate information, including kiosks, community gatherings, and block meetings.
- The group acknowledges the progress made since the Echo Mountain Fire, noting that they are now better prepared to handle emergencies.
- Paul Banas requested that Bill Albright and Michael Tomlinson explore setting up a separate radio channel and testing communication equipment to ensure it works in emergencies.
- The meeting concludes with a commitment to continue improving emergency preparedness and communication within the community.

## **Appendix**

# ***The Great Depoe Bay Fire of 1936 a Chilling Bit of Oregon Coast History***

Published 06/08/21 at 6:10 PM PDT

By Oregon Coast Beach Connection staff



*(Depoe Bay, Oregon) – 1936 was not a very good year on the Oregon coast. In fact, in August and September, the region – recently bursting with tourism activity because of the new Highway 101 – was plagued with conflagration after conflagration. It was the year the Oregon coast burned. (Above: Depoe Bay in the '40s, courtesy North Lincoln County History Museum)*

By mid-September of '36, Bandon was about to experience its complete devastation, Gold Beach and Marshfield (Coos Bay) were in the middle of their own set of forest fires, and Yachats and Waldport were fighting a blaze. There were some 25 different fires along the coastline. Right about then, somewhere between September 15 and 20, a fire broke out near Depoe Bay.


At first it was a somewhat distant forest fire. According to the City of Depoe Bay, there are two versions of how it started. One is that a shingle mill caught fire (possibly



arson), almost a mile east of town. The second is that a homesteader's cabin caught fire. What's been handed down through the ages – but wasn't in newspaper reports at the time – is that local fire officials didn't take it seriously, figuring it would just burn itself out. It was largely burning five miles to the east of town. According to the city, six days later the fire re-erupted and made its way into town.

There are considerable discrepancies in the exact timelines, as one newspaper report dated September 24 indicates the forest fire to the east started around September 15 or earlier, then came under control on Sunday, September 20. In any case, it had ravaged land that had been mostly logged for almost a week, then fanned to new life on Tuesday, September 22, lighting up the green timber just east of Depoe Bay.

This article shows the fire within 500 yards of the community on the 24th, with firefighters guarding the area and soaking everything with water. A man named Cy Olson and his family were getting set to be evacuated as their home was just across the street from the flames, and then came the order. They moved all their belongings across the bay.



*Depoe Bay in the '20s, showing a remarkably bare, undeveloped North Point. Courtesy North Lincoln County History Museum*

Flames were encroaching on the schoolhouse, being driven by heavy winds on the coast – a hot east wind that apparently shot up to 35 mph at certain points.

Then, according to the city, it hit the town with a roar and it jumped the highway. The Capital Journal (Statesman Journal) called it a “spectacular blaze in the timber between the highway and the ocean.”

Some 200 men fought against it, using small but powerful pumps attached to any little stream or body of water they could find. Boys from the Civilian Conservation Corps helped out along with soldiers stationed in the area, and even tourists who had driven in by car out of curiosity got out and assisted.

At one point, the fire marshal, now backed with federal authority, issued “get out now” orders to just about all the town’s people. “If you have any valuables, move them out,” he told everyone in town. Many simply moved their stuff into the streets to keep it away from their own walls.

One family moved in and out of their home six times over a few days.

12 families were left destitute by the fire, according to the city, and newspaper reports indicate not a single home “stands without blackened stumps and logs almost touching them.” Several homes had caught fire but were put out eventually.

By September 28 it had all come under control and stopped menacing the town, although some areas just east were still smoldering. Then came a series of rain storms, and according to reports it was the first the population slept at night for a while.

Some two and a half miles along the beaches had burned.





Photos above, courtesy North Lincoln County History Museum

**North Lincoln Fire and Rescue**

**Echo Mountain Fire Complex  
and Straight Line Wind Event  
OERS #2020-2258**

**After Action Review**

**Submitted by: Organizational Quality Associates 1-3-2021**

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## Echo Mountain Fire Complex Overview

On Monday, September 7, 2020 at approximately 2300 hours multiple fire starts were reported near Otis, Oregon. The starts coincided with a Red Flag fire behavior warning issued by the National Weather Service for a forecasted East wind event that lasted several days. The result was large fires were burning in all western Oregon, from the northern to the southern border. The fires were burning in the urban interface area--leading to large scale evacuations and extreme demand for firefighting resources. This demand was compounded by sustained, long-term large fire activity in California and other western states. Consequently, local, regional, and national firefighting resources were in short supply, leaving few to respond to new incidents.

Numerous official warmings, advisories, and alerts were issued by agencies before and during the Echo Mountain and Kimberling fires:

- Countywide Burn Ban began at 1300 hours on 09/03/20
- Fire Weather Watch by the National Weather Service began at 1000 hours on 09/08/20
- Red Flag Warning by the National Weather Service began at 1200 hours on 09/07/20
- Smoke Advisory by the National Weather Service at 1809 hours on 09/11/20
- Lincoln Alerts public messaging sent out:
  - Burn Ban at 1300 hours on 09/03/20
  - Red Flag/Fire Weather Watch at 1809 hours on 09/06/20
  - Smoke Advisory at 1951 hours on 09/07/20

With this backdrop, local Fire Districts, and mutual aid partners (comprised of neighboring County Fire Districts as well as surrounding municipalities and other counties), along with what was available from local, state, and federal resources, responded to the Echo Mountain and Kimberling fires near Otis. On September 8, the two fires made extensive runs, threatening several thousand structures, and forcing significant evacuations. The scarcity of resources required that firefighting resources concentrate on evacuations with limited tactical operations for the next 3 days. The Oregon Department of Forestry (ODF) put together a short Type 3 Incident Management Team (IMT) that successfully limited the spread of the Kimberling Fire. After 4 days, on September 11 at 0600, a short Type 1 IMT (components from ODF IMT1) with an Incident Commander (IC) from the Florida Forest Service assumed command of what became the Echo Mountain Fire Complex.

The local Fire Districts, assisting agencies, and cooperators stopped the forward spread of the fires prior to the transfer of command to ODF IMT 1. The complex terrain, steep slopes, loose coastal soils, and extensive wildland urban interface added to the complexity of this incident. Additional complexities included extensive evacuations, infrastructure damage, highway closures, and lack of resources across the nation.

Local County and Lincoln City agencies' leadership recognized that the response to the incident was one that would likely occur again and had the foresight to recognize that they could improve. With that in mind, a Request for a Proposal to develop an After Action Review was issued through the North Lincoln Fire and Rescue District 1.

## After Action Review

An After Action Review (AAR) of the local and State of Oregon response to Echo Mountain Fire Complex within Lincoln County, Oregon, was conducted virtually on November 30, 2020. The AAR was attended by participants from various agencies within Lincoln City, , Lincoln County, and the State of Oregon. A list of attendees and their agencies is included as an appendix to this document.

The AAR was facilitated by an external consultant, Organizational Quality Associates, Inc (OQA). Report content was captured through participant discussions during the review, and individual interviews before the review. Based on participant comments and descriptions of the Echo Mountain Fire Complex response, OQA recommends five key improvement areas for consideration by the lead agencies.

A sizeable number of additional suggestions meant to increase response efficiencies were made by the AAR participants. These are contained within the participant responses of this report and should be studied for possible inclusion in the AAR's Improvement Plan.

The AAR reviewed the following **Echo Mountain Fire Complex** response capabilities:

- *Initial Fire Response (first 36 hours)*
- *County Fire Mutual Aid*
- *Incident Management (Type 3 to Type 1 transition)*
- *Public Evacuation Process, Sheltering Operations, and Law Enforcement Mutual Aid*
- *Public Information*
- *EOC Operations and Coordination*

Participants were asked to respond to the following questions for each of the response capability categories:

1. *What notable objectives were met during the Echo Mountain Fire Complex?*
2. *What were the most difficult challenges and how were they overcome?*
3. *What issues/tasks were not resolved, and what will it take to resolve them?*

In this report, the responses given by the participants are organized into six common themes:

1. *Communications*
2. *Incident Management, Call Center and EOC Coordination*
3. *Staffing*
4. *Preparedness*
5. *Evacuations and Sheltering*
6. *Relationships*

## **AAR Participant Responses**

### **Notable Objectives Met During the Echo Mountain Fire Complex Response**

#### **Objectives Met - Communications**

- Overcoming the lack of communication regarding the incidents when the cell phone tower went down by still making sound dispatch decisions.
- Lincoln City Dispatch was able to get additional dispatchers on console to assist with influx of calls. Communication from the incidents to dispatch worked well until power was disrupted at the communication tower and the batteries for both cell phone and radio system ran out of power.
- Initial communication between the IC and dispatch via radio provided timely updates and excellent situational awareness.
- Initial communication between the IC and County Emergency Management via cell phone provided timely updates, excellent situational awareness, and coordination.
- Timely notifications regarding incident status and evacuations were made by Lincoln City dispatch, County Emergency Management, and the Sheriff's office.
- Cell phone communication was the most successful form of communication until the Highland cell phone tower was compromised.
- Timely information regarding status of incidents to dispatch insured that distractions were minimized.
- Depoe Bay Fire District's resources had good situational awareness because of cell phone communications with the IC.
- When Toledo Dispatch lost communication, Lincoln City Dispatch was able to successfully take over their 911 call system.
- Lincoln City Dispatch was able to send CAD events between WVCC and LCPD after internet service was restored. This was important for communication between centers.
- Moving the Sheriff's Office command center trailer from Rose Lodge to Lincoln City augmented communication when the Highland Tower site lost power and batteries ran out and there was no generator on site.
- Timely communication provided good situational awareness on the status of the incidents.
- Communication between local Fire Chiefs and ODF was good.
- Timely information was provided to evacuees.
- The Lincoln County emergency notification system (Everbridge and Lincoln Alerts) worked well.
- Bilingual public messaging was accomplished after day 2.
- The PIOs were able to get and distribute timely information to the public.
- Establishing and updating traplines for public information was achieved.
- Positive media contacts were made.
- The Call Center was effective once initiated.

- The EOC and Fire resources received daily copies of the ICS-209s and Incident Action Plans. These were used at daily Division briefings and given to all crews.

### **Objectives Met - Incident Management, Call Center and EOC Coordination**

- The response was orderly and calm.
- Dispatchers were calm and professional throughout the chaotic time of initial response and extended attack.
- Containment efforts on the Kimberly Mtn. incident paid off with only the Echo Mtn. Fire making a sustained run.
- Ambulances running medical emergency calls independently lifted that burden from the Fire Districts so they could focus on the incidents.
- A requested Declaration of Conflagration from the Oregon State Fire Marshal's Office (OSFM) was initially turned down due to lack of Statewide resources. This fire was put in the queue if resources became available. None did. After the event OSFM made a policy decision to provide reimbursement to structural resources. This relieved a substantial financial burden to all Structural Mutual Aid agencies.
- Management of the Complex by the Lincoln County Type 4 IMT and the ODF Type 3 IMT prior to Transfer of Command to the ODF Type 1 IMT on September 11<sup>th</sup> set the Type 1 IMT up for success.
- All County Structural Fire Mutual Aid partners did a great job, stopping the fire before it reached Lincoln City.
- Communication and coordination between the Type 1 IMT and the local jurisdictions, including distribution of IAP's, coordination with local PIOs, EOCs, Sheriff's Office, Fire Chiefs, and government officials was efficient --a reflection of the leadership provided by the Type 1 IC from Florida.
- Recognizing the need and establishing a debris management team early on was effective in setting up the recovery process.
- Recognizing the need and establishing a donation management team and center early on was effective.
- The EOC coordinator briefings were well-attended across jurisdictions and response partners.
- Using triage criteria for structure protection was limited but successful.

### **Objectives Met -Staffing**

- Getting timely additional staffing to support dispatch operations was a success.
- Getting the order for a Type 1 IMT filled was a success. The Type 1 Team was ordered on September 9 and was in place less than 24 hours later.
- Volunteers were essential to the success of the PIO's.
- A modified staffing plan was adjusted several times and coordinated resources for structural fire protection. This plan utilized Mutual Aid partners and a combination of volunteer and career staff.

### **Objectives Met -Preparedness**

- Fire weather predictions allowed County Fire Districts to prepare for the incident (recall of resources, additional staffing).
- A coordinated statewide call to all Fire Defense Boards and Fire Chiefs by the State Fire Marshal relayed vital information for preparedness.

### **Objectives Met - Evacuation and Sheltering**

- Initial attack with limited resources on 2 separate incidents with significant urban interface primarily focused on evacuations without any fatalities.
- The Otis Fire Hall was used as the initial evacuation point worked well but was quickly overwhelmed.
- Timely decisions on evacuations of both people and animals led to success without any fatalities.
- Utilizing the Otis Fire Hall as staging for the Sheriff's Office Animal Control resources and coordination worked well.
- A clearly defined and signed evacuation route by the Sheriff's Office helped with the successful evacuation.
- Anticipating the need for a re-population plan for evacuated areas was helpful.
- Accomplishing a mass evacuation without experience and with no fatalities is notable.

### **Objectives Met -Relationships**

- The seamless response of different agencies on the incidents is notable.
- The seamless response of mutual aid resources is notable.
- Coordination and support from the Fire Defense Board and the State Fire Marshal's Office was excellent
- Coordination with the Sheriff's Office and the delivery of care to an injured firefighter occurred efficiently.
- Working relationships with the Sheriff's Office Search and Rescue ensured that personnel coordinated closely with all assigned resources and were not lost in the chaos.
- Developed relationships led to all eight structural fire agencies responding, as well as resources from neighboring counties, despite not having a formal mutual aid agreement. Nineteen different agencies sent resources, which reflects the spirit of the fire service.
- The response from local Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management was appreciated.
- The response of mutual aid resources was critical to a successful outcome during the first 36 hours of the incident due to resource scarcity.



- Despite having to move the sheltering operation several times, the coordinated effort between the county EOC and the American Red Cross was effective due to previously established relationships.

#### **Objectives Met -Relationships**

- Established relationships led to a smooth and successful public information effort.
- The work and coordination between law enforcement agencies throughout the incident was excellent.

### **Difficult Challenges Overcome During the Incident**

#### **Difficult Challenges Overcome - Communications**

- Communication was a challenge given the different cell phone vendors and unreliability of service. Examples such as the loss of the Highland Cell Tower site, Van Duzer Corridor being a notorious dead spot for radio coverage, and interoperability issues with radios were solved through an interim solution of switching to common direct radio frequencies that solved part of the problem.
- Loss of internet service between Valley and Coast took down Lincoln City Dispatch CAD system.
- Initially dispatchers thought there was one fire. There were two separate fires separated by three miles. Because of that there was a 40-minute delay in dispatching fire resources to the second fire. There was an overwhelming number of calls reporting fires in different locations. After that was corrected resources were immediately sent and evacuations were initiated. Both incidents were successfully coordinated by dispatch.
- Common direction for personnel establishing roadblocks was at first not available but was resolved with specific direction.
- Getting information to the EOC was difficult but was overcome by using current available technology.
- The loss of County email services also meant the loss of key contact lists. A workaround utilizing cell phone text messaging filled the gap.
- Cell phone service for the affected public was spotty at best. The utilization of media and other forms of communication solved the problem.
- The County EOC, located in the County Courthouse, experienced technology outages at different times including Gmail, internet access, webpage access, and network directory directories. Alternate systems (Everbridge) were used for contacts to cooperators when County Gmail was down.

#### **Difficult Challenges Overcome - Incident Management, Call Center and EOC Coordination**

- Dispatch was able to prioritize fire and EMS response without updated intelligence once communication systems were compromised.
- Down power/data transmission lines impeded access due to private property concerns until a recognition of life/safety issues allowed the emergency removal of the lines.

- Some Sheriff's Office personnel were unsure of their evacuation responsibilities initially, but they quickly realized evacuation was their responsibility and responded accordingly.
- Access issues for the responders were resolved by finding alternate routes.
- Access from the Toledo ODF Office was compromised due to transportation routes to Lincoln City being blocked by downed trees. Assistance was needed from the Dallas ODF Office to provide initial attack until highways could be cut open and Toledo could respond.
- Rumor management from social media sites was achieved.

#### **Difficult Challenges Overcome - Staffing**

- Scarcity of resources due to high fire activity in Oregon and California was solved by limiting the tactical fire response to primarily accomplishing evacuations.
- Not enough experienced deputies in evacuations. Overcame by using volunteers.
- Not enough resources required staggering work schedules.
- Agencies or Agency Representatives for Emergency Support Functions for the County EOC was limited due to agency response needs.

#### **Difficult Challenges Overcome - Preparedness**

No issues were identified

#### **Difficult Challenges Overcome - Evacuation and Sheltering**

- Fire progression causing relocation of the shelter operations four times at the immediate onset of the shelter and COVID19 conditions created immediate sheltering limitations for evacuees. Motel and hotel rooms were initiated to relocate evacuees from congregate sheltering to non-congregate sheltering. The City of Newport, for their use of the Newport Rec Center made the difference in these initial operations.

#### **Difficult Challenges Overcome - Relationships**

No issues were identified

## **What Issues Were Not Resolved and What Will it Take to Resolve Them:**

(note: the agencies are in parentheses who made the statements)

### **Unresolved Issues - Communications**

1. ODF's radio repeaters did not work well – this is a long-term issue.
2. We need a radio cache for extended attack operations. Uniform frequency handheld radios were not available for responders. (Fire)
3. Highland Cell Tower Site needs to be hardened against future incidents including a backup system and emergency power. Highland Tower Site does not have an emergency generator on-site, so when batteries failed there was not power until County Facilities and AT&T supplied a generator and 24/7 fuel resupply. (Fire, LCSO, EOC)
4. Batteries for Sheriff's Office communication trailer are insufficient backup for communication during long term power outage. A backup power source is needed. (LCSO)
5. Lack of a mobile communication center and common radio frequencies hindered operations. (Fire and LCSO)
6. Radio communication interoperability by all agencies involved was lacking. (Fire)
7. Lincoln City PD can communicate on Law 1 and Law 2 on their back up radio system. They were never asked to assist when WVCC got overwhelmed. Lincoln City and North Lincoln Fire have and added antennas and a new tower. Reprogramming the current back up radios to establish standalone resources on their Avtec consoles is a very cost effective solution. Establishing Lincoln City 911 as an additional back up site for county operations if Newport ever gets impacted like this and WVCC cannot stand up the backup center in Newport. (Dispatch)
8. Unit designators and last name conventions were used on the radio by resources on the same incident. Need to develop a common standard. (Fire)
9. Coordination was lacking with ODOT about the priorities of clearing transportation access. (Fire, LCSO)

### **Unresolved Issues - Incident Management, EOC and Call Center Coordination**

10. Unified Command was not formally established; therefore communications, objective development, logistics, and planning were done by separate response agencies. There was no established Unified Command representing all responsible jurisdictions. (Fire)
11. There was a lack of common tactical, incident situational awareness, and communications with adjoining forces. (Fire)
12. The County Fire Districts could not fill the ICS positions needed for a Type 3 organization. The County structural fire agencies need to have additional personnel trained to fill ICS roles and be prepared to start a Type 3 level team, locally or regionally, and be used to coordinate with ODF and the Oregon State Fire Marshal. (Fire)
13. Lack of maps reduced situational awareness by the County EOCs, PIOs and responders during initial and extended response. Maps became available once the ODF Type 1 IMT was in place. (EOC, Fire, and LCSO)
14. Responders were unable to coordinate all resources during evacuation. (LCSO)

15. Traffic management during evacuations was difficult. More resources and coordination between ODOT, cities and Law Enforcement. (EM, Fire, LCSO)
16. Responders were unable to coordinate with all responsible agencies in the developing the tactical plan. (Fire)
17. We need to be together for an operational period briefing in the same place. Together we should make critical decisions such as prioritizing evacuations, structural protection, fire attack and tactics. (Fire/LCSO)
18. In the wildland fire environment, we have different levels of capability, training, and safety standards such as the "10 and 18" and PPE within the County fire service agencies. (Fire)
19. There was no formal transition/transfer of command plan. (Fire)
20. Additional trained staff and support need to be available to staff the County EOC for 24/7 operation when needed. (EOC)
21. The County structural agencies need to strengthen their commitment to each other in an event like this. There needed to be 2-3 strike teams of structural protection resources in the first 12 hours. It took 30 hours to get the needed help. In the first 12-24 there only a few resources sent. (Fire) Nontraditional response agency personnel have not been trained to fill needed EOC staff positioned. (LCSO)
22. Evacuation Door Notification signs were not initially available during the evacuation process but were later available. (EOC/LCSO)
23. Information regarding specific property status was not available during the first week to 9 days of the response which the public had requested. The Sheriff's Office instituted a process for the evacuee's to "check on their properties" on 09/13. (EOC)
24. Call Center was not staffed 24/7 but there was a current conditions recorded message 24/7 and the option to leave a message for a return call the next day. (EOC)
25. It was challenging to transfer information from Fire Command to Law Command to County EOC for GIS evacuation maps - integrated mapping system by all agencies would have been more streamlined. (EOC)
26. Providing press briefings may have helped with sharing of current information with public and media. Few were provided except for prerecorded updates from Fire and law enforcement agencies. (EOC)
27. Bilingual capability for notifications, news releases, and current information templates were not available until the second day. (EOC)
28. Written County EOC sit reps were not initiated due to shortage of EOC support staff; however, detailed cooperator calls began on 09/10. (EOC)

#### **Unresolved Issues -Staffing**

29. More Assistant PIOs at the County EOC were needed to meet all the public communications needs. (EOC)
30. There was a shortage of public affairs or PIOs in key agencies. (EOC)
31. During the first 36 hours, there was no PIO at the incident to gather on-site information in a timely manner. (EOC)
32. Trained personnel were not available to establish a local (City/County) Type 3 IMT. (Fire)

### **Unresolved Issues -Staffing**

33. The current EOC physical space is challenging and does not accommodate space needed for full staffing activation or for utilizing EOC tools such as displaying of event maps/projection of current situation; however, County BOC has long term plan to build new EOC facility. (EOC)

### **Unresolved Issues - Preparedness**

34. The Lincoln City EOC was not activated. (EOC)
35. Not all jurisdictional partners recognized that disaster information is located on the County website. (EOC)
36. Mutual Aid resources wanted to be released after about 4 days. There is no Lincoln County-wide fire services established policy or mutual aid agreement for either initial/extended attack or longer timeframe such as fourteen days. Reimbursement standards should be part of the mutual aid agreement. (Fire)
37. There was no plan identifying long-term ICS facilities such as Incident Command Post, Incident Base, or Incident Camp. (Fire)
38. The local radio station did not have a generator for backup power. (EOC)

### **Unresolved Issues - Relationships, Evacuations and Sheltering**

No issues were identified.

## OQA's Key Recommendations

OQA offers five key recommendations which could substantially resolve many of the 40 “Challenges Not Overcome” shown in this After Action Report. Many of the challenges also have specific recommendations for resolution that came from the participants. We are not re-stating these participant recommendations, however, we believe they should also be considered for adoption in the AAR Improvement Plan.

The following are broader OQA recommendations that, if addressed and implemented, we believe will lead to a more robust, cohesive response to future incidents like the Echo Mountain Complex. Note: The numbers at the end of each recommendation reference “What Issues Were Not Resolved and What Will it Take to Resolve Them.”

**1. Unified Command:** Develop criteria and standards for when Unified Command should be used within Lincoln County. The standards and criteria should apply to all agencies having legal responsibility for an incident within Lincoln County. This includes not only Fire Districts, city, and county response agencies but also any state or federal agency with emergency response responsibilities within the County. Advantages of having Unified Command vary depending on what kind of an incident is involved, the complexity and duration of the incident, and the responsible agencies from within and outside the county. Unified Command not only ensures one operational Incident Action Plan (IAP) with one set of objectives but also can strengthen the capabilities of the County's IMT in Logistics, Planning, and Command Staff. A Unified Command with a blended (not duplicative) Command and General Staff, Unit Leaders, and Division/Group Supervisors can also relieve part of the workload for EOCs and dispatch organizations. (Challenges 10, 11, 14 – 16)

**2. Lincoln County Type 3 All Hazards IMT:** Develop through training and exercises an All Hazards Type 3 IMT made up of personnel from Lincoln County agencies and organizations only or with one or two adjoining counties to the east of Lincoln County, such as Benton and Polk Counties. Consider increasing the pool of qualified and available personnel by recruiting both in County, and in adjacent counties with mutual interest in the ability to field a qualified All Hazards Type 3 IMT for extended attack or to take command to complete incident actions such as mop-up or incident rehabilitation. At a minimum, recruit, train and fill positions for Incident Commander, Logistics, Operations, PIO, Safety, Liaison, Plans, and Finance. Consider augmenting with Division and Group Supervisor, Unit Leaders, and other miscellaneous overhead personnel to ensure the IMT can meet anticipated needs without having to fill through the resource ordering process.

The Emergency Management Institute and National Fire Administration offer guidelines and materials which can help jurisdictions develop a Type 3 IMT program and organization. The advantages for having a local All Hazards Type 3 IMT helps ensure that needed position training is obtained and multiple agencies train and exercise together. Additionally, the limited available

transportation routes into Lincoln County after an earthquake/tsunami will likely limit the availability of out-of-county IMTs for assistance to Lincoln County. (Challenges 12, 13, 31, 32)

### **3. Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs):**

Update existing or newly develop Emergency Operations Center (EOC) standard operating procedures (SOP) to identify the necessary EOC organization by activation level. Recruit, train and exercise a base organization dedicated to serve in the EOC when activated above day-to-day operations. Extend recruitment efforts to other agencies/departments internal and external to the County, including State EOC, as needed.

Immediately explore all opportunities for expanding the square footage of the County EOC facility and equipping it with state-of-the-art communication and coordination tools. A fully functional EOC, both in space and equipment, is critical for the EOC to fulfill its mission of coordination and support to IMTs.

Conduct facilitated discussions with Lincoln City EOC personnel and other City-level EOCs that may activate during a complex incident to pre-determine the roles and responsibilities of each. Reach agreement on how all activated EOCs in the County will integrate and coordinate tasks and actions to best serve Lincoln County responders and residents during a catastrophic incident including, but not limited to:

- a. Notification and mobilization of public officials and trained volunteer workers.
- b. Activation and operational guidelines of a Joint Information Center, and Call Centers.
- c. Gathering and organizing threat assessment and incident status information.
- d. Ordering and mobilizing incident management and response resources.

Challenges: (19, 21, 23-30, 34)

**4. Fire Districts:** Develop training and uniform standards for all County Fire Districts and mutual aid resources expected to be mobilized for wildfire incidents. including, but not limited to:

- a. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) such as fire-resistant clothing (not structural turnout gear), hard hats, 8-inch lace up boots, fire shelters, and gloves).
- b. Tactical skills tied to the positions filled.
- c. Safety (10 Standard Orders, 18 Watch Out Situations, communication, etc.).
- d. An annual wildland fire refresher.
- e. Training commensurate with expected positions.
- f. A mechanism to qualify, certify and document qualifications of personnel.

Consider utilizing the County Fire Defense Board for achieving uniform standards.  
(Challenges: 17)

**5. Lincoln County Fire Districts Mutual Aid Agreement:** Develop a countywide Mutual Aid Agreement. The agreement should include reimbursement standards for equipment and personnel and when reimbursement applies.

(Challenge: 36)

**6. Fire Districts' Relationships:** The Fire Districts within the County should strengthen their commitment to each other for incidents such as the Echo Mountain Fire Complex. This could be accomplished through the leadership of Fire Defense Board and implementation of Recommendations number 2, 4, and 5. (Challenge: 20)



## Appendix

	<b>As of 12-01-20 @ 1200 hours</b>	
<b>Nov 22, 2020 Echo Mtn AAR</b>	<b>Participant List</b>	
<b>0800-0855 Dispatching</b>	<b>Agency</b>	<b>Title</b>
Curtis Landers	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Sheriff
Ian Wilson	Willamette Valley Communications Center	Dispatch Supervisor
Matt Thomas	Oregon Department of Forestry	Unit Forester
Adam Shanks	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Administrative Lt.
Rob Dahlman	North Lincoln Fire & Rescue	Fire Chief
Rob Murphy	Newport Fire Department, County FDB Chief	Fire Chief
Bryan Daniels	Depoe Bay Fire District	Fire Chief
Derek Etheridge	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Patrol Sgt.
Michael Curran	Oregon Department of Forestry	District Forester
Shannon Miller	Oregon State Fire Marshal's Office	Field Deputy FM
Paul Compton	Lincoln City Police Department	Dispatch Supervisor
Thomas Jackson	Depoe Bay Fire District	Division Chief
<b>0900-0955 Initial Fire Response</b>	<b>Agency</b>	<b>Title</b>
BrianTucker	Oregon State Police	Lieutenant
Curtis Landers	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Sheriff
Brian Cameron	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Patrol Lt.
M. Cotes		
Adam Shanks	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Administrative Lt.
Loren Nordyke	North Lincoln Fire & Rescue	Batt. Chief
Bryan Daniels	Depoe Bay Fire District	Fire Chief
Matt Thomas	Oregon Department of Forestry	Unit Forester
Lyle Mattson	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Lt.
Rob Dahlman	North Lincoln Fire & Rescue	Fire Chief
Derek Etheridge	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Patrol Sargent
Michael Curran	Oregon Department of Forestry	District Forester
Rob Murphy	Newport Fire Department, County FDB Chief	Fire Chief
Shannon Miller	Oregon State Fire Marshal's Office	Field Deputy FM
Thomas Jackson	Depoe Bay Fire District	Division Chief
<b>1000-1055 County Fire Mutual Aid</b>		
Bryan Daniels	Depoe Bay Fire District	Fire Chief
Matt Thomas	Oregon Department of Forestry	Unit Forester
Rob Dahlman	North Lincoln Fire & Rescue	Fire Chief
Rob Murphy	Newport Fire Department, County FDB Chief	Fire Chief
Shannon Miller	Oregon State Fire Marshal's Office	Field Deputy FM
Thomas Jackson	Depoe Bay Fire District	Division Chief

<b>Nov 22, 2020 Echo Mtn AAR</b>	<b>Participant List</b>	
<b>1100-1155 Incident Management</b>	<b>Agency</b>	<b>Title</b>
M. Cates		
Curtis Landers	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Sheriff
Adams Shanks	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Administrative Lt.
Rick Dolan	Florida Forest Service	ODF IMT-1 Incident Commander
Shannon Miller	Oregon State Fire Marshal's Office	Field Deputy FM
Bryan Daniels	Depoe Bay Fire District	Fire Chief
Matt Thomas	Oregon Department of Forestry	Unit Forester
Jenny Demaris	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Emergency Manager
Rob Dahlman	North Lincoln Fire & Rescue	Fire Chief
Lyle Mattson	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Lt.
Derek Etheridge	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Patrol Sargent
Michael Curran	Oregon Department of Forestry	District Forester
Ken Murphy	City of Lincoln City	Emergency Manager
Bob Harvey	Newport Fire Department	Assistant Fire Chief
Rob Murphy	Newport Fire Department, County FDB Chief	Fire Chief
Thomas Jackson	Depoe Bay Fire District	Division Chief
<b>1300-1355 Public Evacuation, Sheltering and Law Enforcement Mutual Aid</b>		
Patrick Dougherty	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Patrol Sgt & SAR
Bruce McGuire	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Deputy & SAR Coordinator
Adam Shanks	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Administrative Lt.
Brian Cameron	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Patrol Lt.
Lyle Mattson	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Lt.
Bryan Daniels	Depoe Bay Fire District	Fire Chief
Matt Thomas	Oregon Department of Forestry	Unit Forester
Jenny Demaris	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Emergency Manager
Rob Dahlman	North Lincoln Fire & Rescue	Fire Chief
Laura Ireland	Lincoln County Animal Services	Animal Shelter Director
Derek Etheridge	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Patrol Sargent
Michael Curran	Oregon Department of Forestry	District Forester
Michelle Hendrick	American Red Cross	
Ken Murphy	City of Lincoln City	Emergency Manager
Shannon Miller	Oregon State Fire Marshal's Office	Field Deputy FM
Thomas Jackson	Depoe Bay Fire District	Division Chief
Curtis Landers	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Sheriff
Rene Lopez	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Patrol Sgt.
M. Cates		
Susan Trachsel		Alternate PIO

<b>1400-1455 Public Information</b>	<b>Participant List</b>	
Jess Palma		PIO Support
Susan Trachsel		Alternate PIO
Curtis Landers	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Sheriff
Samantha Buckley	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Asst. Emergency Manager
Casey Miller		Lead PIO
Matt Thomas	Oregon Department of Forestry	Unit Forester
Jenny Demaris	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Emergency Manager
Rob Dahlman	North Lincoln Fire & Rescue	Fire Chief
Michael Curran	Oregon Department of Forestry	District Forester
Shannon Miller	Oregon State Fire Marshal's Office	Field Deputy FM
Ken Murphy	City of Lincoln City	Emergency Manager
<b>Nov 22, 2020 Echo Mtn Complex AAR</b>		
<b>1500-1555 – EOC Ops. and Coordination</b>	<b>Agency</b>	<b>Title</b>
Susan Trachsel		Alternate PIO
Adam Shanks	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Adm. Lt.
Samantha Buckley	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Asst. EM Manager
Matt Thomas	Oregon Department of Forestry	Unit Forester
Jenny Demaris	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Emergency Manager
Rob Dahlman	North Lincoln Fire & Rescue	Fire Chief
Curtis Landers	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Sheriff
Jess Palma		PIO Support
Michael Curran	Oregon Department of Forestry	District Forester
Ken Murphy	City of Lincoln City	Emergency Manager
Shannon Miller	Oregon State Fire Marshal's Office	Field Deputy FM
Thomas Jackson	Depoe Bay Fire District	Division Chief
<b>1600-1700 Host Agencies</b>		
Ken Murphy	City of Lincoln City	Emergency Manager
Rob Dahlman	North Lincoln Fire & Rescue	Fire Chief
Jenny Demaris	Lincoln County Sheriff's Office	Emergency Manager
Matt Thomas & Michael Curran	Oregon Department of Forestry	Unit Forester/District Forester